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READING BETWEEN THE LINES: INDIGENT
DEFENSE ISSUES AND THE RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
KIM A. TAYLOR*

In the development and analysis of rules of professional responsibility, it has long
been recognized that criminal defense is, simply stated, different. Many ethical
codes acknowledge this distinction but rarely explain the difference sufficiently to
provide practical guidance. And, frankly, if criminal defense is characterized as
"different," then indigent defense should probably be described as "peculiar." When
the attorney-client relationship is formed not by client choice, but by judicial
appointment, dilemmas arise beyond those traditionally recognized in ethics codes.
Moreover, prevailing indigent defense delivery systems are not uniform and generate
unique ethical issues. To its credit, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
makes an initial effort, primarily in commentary, to explain some of the idiosyncratic obligations imposed on lawyers who provide defense services to the indigent.
However, much like the American Bar Association Model Rules, the Restatement
far too frequently requires the public defender or appointed counsel to read between
the lines to discern that which would be deemed appropriate conduct given the state
of the law. To be of real practical use, the Restatement must address concrete
practice situations that arise within the context of indigent defense.
Some might argue that the design of the Restatement necessarily limits its reach:
Because the Restatement must report the law as it exists, it remains powerless to
address indigent defense issues that the case law ignores. Admittedly, the drafters
must exercise care in developing illustrations of the law which clarify obligations
rather than create new or alter existing ones. However, some lawmaking inevitably
results from this process. And if the drafters make previously implicit obligations
explicit by including examples which apply the traditional formulations of the law
to nontraditional dilemmas, they will begin to shape the law. Such "lawmaking"
appropriately falls within the mandate of the Restatement.
Obviously, neither the Restatement nor any other guide for professional conduct
can identify every ethical dilemma and corresponding obligation that will arise in
practice. However, because much of the analysis contained in the most recent drafts
of the Restatement assumes a narrow construction of client-lawyer relationships, the
explanations of responsibilities invariably overlook issues that confront lawyers and
clients in nontraditional relationships. By expanding the concept of the client-lawyer
relationship to include the various models of service delivery that characterize

* Associate Professor, Stanford Law School. J.D., 1980, Yale Law School; A.B., 1977, Brown
University. I am grateful to Deborah Rhose, Janet Alexander, Janet Halley, Linda Krieger, and Anthony
Thompson for their helpful comments.
1. To the extent that the drafters attempt to resolve ambiguities in the law, they are explicitly
engaging in this process. By making judgments that some issues merit discussion while others do not,
the drafters are implicitly making law as they influence the direction of the law.
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indigent defense - public defender systems, contract systems, and appointed
counsel programs - the Restatement could come closer to achieving its dual goals
of resolving ambiguities in lawyers' obligations and providing safeguards to
clients In order to highlight some issues peculiar to indigent defense that the
Restatement should address but currently ignores, I focus on chapter 2, "The ClientLawyer Relationship."
L Drafting Modifications to Address Indigent Defense Issues
The first section of chapter 2, "Formation of a Client-Lawyer Relationship,"
describes the manner in which a lawyer and a prospective client may create a
relationship. The drafters acknowledge in commentary that, for the most part, they
are examining the duties owed the client in a consensual client-lawyer relationship
the traditional concept. While the drafters note in'the black letter that the clientlawyer relationship may be formed by a tribunal's appointment of counsel,3 they
fail to recognize that appointing authorities extend beyond tribunals. They may
include, for example, the Chief Public Defender who enters into a contract with
groups of lawyers for their services, or an assigned counsel administrator who
assigns lawyers to individual cases. When the drafters begin to address these
nontraditional formations of the client-lawyer relationship, they will discover unique
duties and conflicting loyalties that are currently overlooked by the Restatement.
A. Duties to Client
Any comprehensive exploration of the unique duties owed the client in these
relationships must begin with the nonconsensual nature of the relationship. While
the drafters raise the issue of consent in commentary, they simultaneously evade its
problematic character by suggesting that the client's acceptance of the appointment
constitutes consent This assertion ignores the reality that faced with the daunting
prospect of proceeding pro se against the state, the client may "accept" appointment
of counsel for lack of any real alternative. By obscuring this issue, the drafters
ultimately disserve lawyers and clients. The commentary should instead acknowledge that given the uneasy perch between force and consent, adherence to standards
for the assignment of counsel would be appropriate. Such standards advise
appointing authorities that great care is due for the appointment of counsel to
indigent clients charged with criminal offenses precisely because the client exercises
little, if any, choice in the formation of the relationship.' The drafters should then

2. Although the drafter of the Restatement have decided to devote a separate chapter to the delivery
of legal services, the drafters seem to have adopted the position that when appropriate they would include
obligations of appointed counsel in other chapters as well. The drafters should simply attempt to include
other examples of those duti s throughout the Restatement. Without these additional illustrations, lawyers
will be encouraged to resolve conflicts in their duties of care and loyalty without appropriate guidance.
This cannot be considered ,.ufficient protection for either clients or lawyers.
3. REsTATEMENT OF T,E LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 26 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992).

4. Id. ch. 2, § 26 cmt. g.
5. See STANDARDS FOit THE ADMINISTRATION OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS (Nat'l Legal Aid
& Defender Ass'n, 1989). These standards are currently under consideration by the American Bar
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clarify the lawyer's obligations in this nonconsensual, or at best quasi-consensual,
relationship by advising that, even in those jurisdictions where such standards have
not yet been adopted, a lawyer should determine that she has the requisite
experience contemplated by these standards prior to accepting appointment.
Once the drafters begin to expand their examination of the formation of the
client-lawyer relationship, their analysis should then extend to the context in which
the lawyer operates. The lawyer who represents a client within an institutional
setting, such as a public defender office, may be faced with the problem of
conflicting loyalties to the client and her office. The commentary to the section on
formation of the client-lawyer relationship currently addresses the more traditional
problem of conflicting duties in the context of group representation. Specifically,
the drafters discuss conflicts in obligations owed to members of a class in a class
action where a lawyer undertakes representation of the entire class.6 This section
could apply to the indigent defense context if the drafters would add an illustration
of such a conflict of interest as it arises within an institutional defender office.!
For example, the commentary might include a discussion of an assistant public
defender's duties when she intends to assert a position on behalf of one client with
respect to a change in the law or a new scientific advance which is in opposition
to the objectives the defender office anticipates advancing on behalf of other clients.
The commentary could offer guidance regarding the lawyer's obligations to disclose
this conflict to the individual client as well as the office's duty to notify prospective
clients that the conflict exists. Questions that would arise within the defender office
might include the following: May the lawyer in a defender office ethically choose
among client interests to advance? If so, how does she select those interests to
pursue? Should the defender office refuse to accept, or withdraw, from certain cases
because of this conflict? If so, to whom might those clients turn for representation?
Do defenders, who provide constitutionally mandated services, possess the same
freedom to choose among clients as their civil counterparts? Obviously, the drafters
of the commentary may not be able to resolve or even address all of these
questions, but at least some reference to these issues in the context of an institutional defender office is warranted.
In the current draft of the Restatement, when the drafters address the duty a
lawyer owes her client, they explain that a lawyer must "act in a manner reasonably
calculated to advance a client's lawful objectives, as defined by the client after
disclosure and consultation; [and must] act in the matter with reasonable competence and diligence."' In their efforts to clarify the obligation, the drafters have
made a conscious effort to steer clear of emotional zeal9 and have dangerously

Association.
6. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992).
7. In a forthcoming article, I address the problems that arise when the duties owed to an individual
client come into direct conflict with the interests of the "class" of clients that the defender office
represents.
8. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 28(1), (2) (Tentative Draft No. 5,
1992).
9. Id. § 28 cmt. d (stating that zeal can be "misunderstood to suggest that lawyers are required to
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diluted the concept cf advocacy. Acting zealously for a client is reduced to acting
diligently for that client. While the drafters express concern about unrestrained
advocacy, enciouraging zealous representation does not necessarily invite wild
posturing. Indeed, in the context of representing a client against the power of the
State, more than mere diligence is mandated."0
Unlike most civil cases, criminal cases involve fundamental questions of liberty,
and sometimes even life, that require more than reasonable competence to protect
the client. To begin, the disparity of resources and power between the state and the
defense in a criminal case demands that the accused be afforded greater protection." This elevated protection for clients in criminal cases translates into a
heightened duty for the defense lawyer to act not only as the client's representative,
but also as a constraint on the immense power of the state. Secondly, because
criminal cases are fraught with emotion - such that most jury instructions
explicitly acknowledge this fact' - the criminal defense lawyer must be prepared
to address those passions. To permit a lawyer to enter the battleground of a criminal
case without zeal is to place the client unarmed in a fight for either her life or
liberty. Frequently, the lawyer's fervor constitutes the only weapon an accused
possesses. And yet the Restatement, as currently drafted, ignores this reality and
threatens to rob the client of a fundamental safeguard.
For indigent clients charged with crimes, the need for zeal is perhaps most
critical. Negative preconceptions tend to be multiplied when the accused is poor and
a member of a minority group. Indeed, the lawyer must tackle prejudices held not
only by parties outside of the client-lawyer relationship, but she must be admonished to overcome any negative attitudes that she may hold toward clients. The duty
of reasonable diligence, however, falls to impress upon the lawyer that effective
representation of an indigent accused requires that she zealously attack all
presumptions that prevent the client from receiving fair treatment in the criminal
justice system.
* Since the law leaves room for interpretation of the parameters of the lawyer's
duty of diligence,'3 th- Restatement should not select the lowest common denominator as the standard of conduct. Rather, this section should be expanded to include
a range of definitions of diligence suggesting that, weighing both the gravity of the

function as advocates with a certain emotion or style of litigating, negotiating, or counseling").
10. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1239 (1993); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some
Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIams 1 (1975); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectiveson Legal Practice,
37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985).
11. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusncE:. AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
12. See, e.g., D.C. BA.Z ASS'N, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS at 2.02 (3d ed. 1978) (Function of
the Jury) (admonishing jurors to determine the facts without prejudice, fear, sympathy or favor); id. at
2.14 (Nature of the Charges Not To Be Considered) (cautioning jurors against permitting the character
of the charge to affect their deliberations); 1 CALIFORNIA JURY INsTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL at 1.00 (West
5th ed. 1988) (Respective Duties or Judge and Jury) (informing jury that pity for or prejudice against a
defendant should not influence its analysis of the evidence and further cautioning against passion,
prejudice, public opinion or feeling influencing its verdict).
13. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 2.6.2, at 54-55 (1986).
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conduct and the severity of the consequences, the duty of diligence contemplates
representation with the amount of zeal, fervor, and emotions that are appropriate to
the situation. Without a more developed explanation, the duty of diligence will fail
to capture that which is essential to the effective representation of a client accused
of a crime.

Similarly, in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the lawyer's
duties of competence and diligence, the commentary should address the problems
faced by public defenders as they struggle to provide assistance to ever-increasing
numbers of indigent clients, in the face of limited personnel and shrinking resources.

Despite recommendations that defender offices impose maximum limits on the
numbers of cases assigned to lawyers at a given time,' many public defender

offices experience tremendous political pressure to accept a higher volume of clients
than they can competently represent. Consequently, the commentary to this
section should discuss a lawyer's obligation to inform the appointing authority that
acceptance of additional cases will jeopardize her duty of competence. It should
further inform the lawyer of her duty to refuse.appointment to cases if she believes
they will exceed the number she can effectively handle. 6 To illustrate the impact

14. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS
Standard 13.12 (1973). The standard states:
The caseload of a public defender office should not exceed the following: Felonies per
attorney per year: Not more than 150; Misdemeanors (excluding traffic) per attorney per
year: Not more than 400; Juvenile Court cases per attorney per year: Not more than 200;
Mental health cases per attorney per year: Not more than 200; and appeals per attorney
per year: Not more than 25.
Id.
15. Examples can be found nationwide of excessive caseloads which are crippling public defender
offices. Two recent instances demonstrate the problem. Public defenders in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
carry caseloads as high as 1100 to 1200 misdemeanors per year, three time' the maximum number
recommended. In Louisiana, one defender with the Orleans Indigent Defense Program represented 418
clients in the first seven months of 1991 and obtained a court order holding that his excessive caseload
prevented him from providing effective representation. The judge stated in his order that "[nlot even a
lawyer with an 'S'
on his chest could effectively handle this docket." State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780,789
(La. 1993).

16. See

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES

Standard 5-5.3 (ABA

3d ed. 1992). The standard states:
(a) Neither defender organizations, assigned counsel nor contractors for services should
accept workloads that, by reason of their excessive size, interfere with the rendering of
quality representation or lead to the breach of professional obligations. Special
consideration should be given to the workload created by representation in capital cases.
(b) Whenever defender organizations, individual defenders, assigned counsel or
contractors for services determine, in the exercise of their best professional judgment, that
the acceptance of additional cases or continued representation in previously accepted cases
will lead to the furnishing of representation lacking in quality or to the breach of
professional obligations, the defender organization, individual defender, assigned counsel
or contractor for services must take such steps as may be appropriate to reduce their
pending or projected caseloads, including the refusal of further appointments. Courts
should not require individuals or programs to accept caseloads that will lead to the
furnishing of representation lacking in quality or to the breach of professional obligations.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:63

of excessive caseloads on the lawyer's duties of competence and diligence, the
drafters might provide an example which delineates the steps the defender may
take in that situation. These would include declining appointment, disclosing to
current and potential clients that the lawyer's volume of cases threatens to compromise her duty of competence, or withdrawing from current cases.
B. Option to Withdraw
In yet another context, the Restatement fails both to provide guidance to
appointed counsel and to protect her client. Section 44(3) addresses the issue of
withdrawal from representation, stating that a lawyer may withdraw if "the
representation has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client or by the
irreparable breakdown of the client-lawyer relationship." Unfortunately, the
standard of unreasonable difficulty is far too vague to be of practical use. As
currently drafted, this section adheres to the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, which permits withdrawal if "by other conduct [the client] renders
it unreasonably difficalt for the lawyer to carry out his employment effectively."17
The ABA Model Rules, however, do not contain such a provision and instead
allow withdrawal if "other good cause for withdrawal exists."lR
The illustration in commentary offered to explain the standard of unreasonable
difficulty affords little protection to clients in a nontraditional client-lawyer
relationship. It suggests that the client who refuses to communicate with the
lawyer is unreasonably difficult and permits withdrawl even if it would adversely
affect the client. This illustration omits any discussion regarding the lawyer's duty
either to attempt to determine the reasons for the breakdown in communication or
to explore ways to restore communication. Nor does the commentary urge the
lawyer to exercise care in reaching the decision to withdraw even when the
withdrawl may cause affirmative harm. In order to safeguard the interests of the
client in this situation, the burden should rest on the -lawyer to make efforts to
develop a relationship of trust in order to facilitate communication.
When attorneys are appointed to represent clients, difficulties in communication
can be predicted with virtual certainty. The client understandably mistrusts
appointed counsel because she did not choose this lawyer, knows little or nothing
about the lawyer, and must now place her fate in the hands of a virtual stranger.
To suggest that the client-lawyer relationship will be anything other than strained
and exceptionally difficult, at least initially, ignores the reality of practice. This
section, as currefitly drafted, fails to recognize this inherent difficulty and enables
the lawyer far too easily to withdraw from representation. Consequently, the
language regarding unreasonable difficulty should be excised from the black letter.
The second clause of section 44(3)(g), which suggests that a lawyer may
withdraw if there is an irreparable breakdown of the client-lawyer relationship,

Id.; see also Ligda v. Superor Court, 85 Cal. 744 (1970); Escambia County v. Behr, 384 So. 2d 147
(Fla. 1980).
17. MODEL CODE or PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (C)(1)(d) (1969).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(6) (1983).
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should be the standard espoused; however, it will require further illustration to
identify circumstances that would permit withdrawal. The commentary should
admonish the lawyer, particularly in the context of appointment, not to exercise her
option to withdraw simply because the relationship may be somewhat troublesome.
The commentary should emphasize that "irreparable breakdown" contemplates that
withdrawal will be the option of last resort for the lawyer. It would also serve
lawyers and clients better by outlining steps for working with the difficult client,
and then, if such efforts fail, permit the lawyer to seek to withdraw.' 9 Without
these changes, clients may suffer affirmative harm.
C. Duties to Third Parties
The drafters devote an entire section of chapter 2 to the discussion of the
lawyer's obligations that are defined by contract., Here, again the drafters should
extend the discussion to issues faced by criminal defense practitioners under
contract with the state or a public defender office. In this nontraditional
relationship where the lawyer has a duty not only to the client but to the
contracting party, some rather significant conflicts of interest will often arise.
New Jersey offers a current example of conflicting duties in a context where
there exists little, if any, guidance.2' In that jurisdiction, the public defender
enters into contracts with private attorneys to handle cases in which the public
defender office cannot proceed because of an existing conflict of interest or case
overload. As in virtually every other state during the past year, the New Jersey
legislature drastically cut funding to the public defender office, which prevented
the chief defender from meeting both his payroll and contractual obligations. The
chief defender, faced with the hobson's choice of laying off public defenders or
refusing to pay private counsel under the contract, opted for the latter.' Using
this as an example, the commentary to this section could address the duty of a
lawyer operating pursuant to contract when the chief defender announces that her
fee will not be paid.' The commentary currently notes that a lawyer does not
ordinarily have a duty to honor a contract for services when one of the parties is
in breach of that contract; however, when the services are constitutionally
mandated and the breach was not occasioned by the client, the commentary should
advise the lawyer of her overriding obligation to provide services even though the

19. The commentary could suggest that lawyers should attempt to determine the reasons for the
client's unwillingness to communicate by asking the client to state her objections, by discussing the need
for an effective working relationship, and by explaining that the client will retain the authority both to
define her objectives and to hold the lawyer to her obligation to advance those goals.
20. See REsTATEmENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 29A (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992).
21. In re Representation of Certain Indigent Defendants, Juveniles and Parents, No. E-2 (N.J. 1992).
See generally Kathleen Bird, Defending the Poor: Who Pays?,N.J. L., Sept. 21, 1992, at 1; Hanna W.
Rosin, Justices Stay Hand on Pool Lawyers, N.J. L.J., Nov. 23, 1992, at 1.
22, Bird, supra note 21, at 26.
23. An infinite variety of issues arise from this situation, beginning with the obligations that the
chief defender may or may not have and extending to the obligations of virtually every actor within the
criminal justice system. For purposes of this section of the Restatement, however, some discussion of
the duties of lawyers appointed pursuant to contract may be all that is required.
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funder is in breach.
Moreover, the drafters should address whether or not obligations owed to the
funding authority in a contract for services will be considered subordinate to the
obligations owed to the client. Some illustration of the limits of the duties to the
nonclient/funder in the context of indigent defense may be easily inserted into this
section in order to provide a more complete analysis of this issue. Even a cursory
examination and comparison of views of the client and the funder regarding the
objectives of representation would help to illustrate the nature of the conflict of
interest faced by lawyers attempting both to provide service to the client and to
honor their obligations to the contracting authority. The commentary to this section
already suggests that in a situation where a nonclient underwrites the cost of legal
services to the client, such "nonclient often is not subject to the same pressures as
a client and may not be owed the same fiduciary duties."' At a minimum, the
drafters should augment this discussion by identifying contracting parties, such as
the state, the judiciary:, or the defender office, as examples of such nonclients.
1. Examples of Successful Drafting
While the Restatement should provide clearer guidance to indigent defense
practitioners by including additional illustrations as mentioned above, the drafters
successfully achieve their dual goals of protecting clients and informing lawyers
of the state of the law in two sections of chapter 2: section 34 (Authority Reserved
to Lawyer) and section 35 (Client Under Disability). Operating from the premise
that lawyers often possess more power than their clients in the client-lawyer
relationship, the drafters caution that the exercise of this authority either must be
based upon consultation with the client or, in those situations where consultation
is not possible, must be consistent with objectives that the client has already
identified.
The drafters recognize that, in virtually all representations, a lawyer's authority
to make decisions on behalf of her client will be greater than the limited
description provided in the black letter.' The black letter explains that the client
cannot override the lawyer's authority
(1) to refuse to perform, counsel or assist further in ongoing acts that
the lawyer reasonably believes to be unlawful; (2) to make decisions
that law or an order of a tribunal requires the law to make; and (3) to
decide what should be done on behalf of the client when law or an
order of a tribunal requires an immediate decision without time to
consult the client.2
As any practitioner will admit, this provision leaves the lawyer significant room
within which to make decisions for the client and, consequently, represents an area

24. RESTATEMENT OFT-E LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 29A cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992).
25. Id.§ 34 cmt.a.
26. Id. § 34.
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ripe for abuse. The drafters carefully stress in commentary that even though this
latitude exists, the lawyer has no legal right to impose her own moral views on the
client when the client's interests are at stake.' Especially where counsel is
appointed to represent clients accused of committing often heinous acts, this cannot
be overemphasized. The Restatement properly reminds counsel that the clientlawyer relationship does not empower the lawyer to substitute her moral judgments
for those of her client or to force her client to accept a different view.
Similarly, section 35 exhibits respect for the client and her right to make
decisions regarding her case, even if those decisions ultimately prove unwise. By
instructing that a client has the right to pursue a course of action that the lawyer
considers to be foolish, the Restatementproperly emphasizes that the lawyer should
represent the client's wishes and not determine for the client what those interests
should be. Indeed, the drafters specifically warn that a lawyer should not assume
a client suffers from a mental disability which might necessitate some substitution
of the lawyer's judgment simply because the client insists on an eccentric course.
In the same vein, the drafters note that in juvenile delinquency proceedings where
the lawyer representing the juvenile will often feel inclined to substitute her
judgment for that of the minor client, the lawyer should resist this impulse by
adhering to the function of advocate and agent of the client, not judge or
guardian.' In those instances when the lawyer must substitute her judgment for
her client, the commentary urges the lawyer to consider the client's circumstances,
problems, needs, character, and values in order to calculate what the client's
desires would be if the client were able to express them.' While in practice, the
rule still leaves lawyers room to interpret the clients' views and may not control
the lawyers' instincts sufficiently, at least the commentary offers guidance for the
substitution of judgment.
11. Conclusion
In order to be comprehensive and of practical use, the commentary to chapter
2 of the Restatement should include illustrations of the distinctive problems that
arise in the context of providing criminal defense representation under the various
indigent defense delivery systems. In an area where clients are potentially the most
vulnerable, we tend to leave lawyers with, at best, limited guidance both in
determining the duties imposed by the relationship and in resolving conflicts that
arise in the context of such relationships. By acknowledging that the appointment
of counsel may carry its own set of ethical dilemmas and duties, the drafters have
at least begun to offer guidance in an area that has long been considered to have
different, but unspecified, obligations. With the inclusion of additional illustrations
examining those dilemmas, the Restatement may help to make ethical considerations in the context of indigent defense a little less peculiar.

27. Id. § 34 cmt. e.
28. Il § 35 cmt. c.
29. Id. § 35 cmt. d.
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